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Abstract
We study the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization in a federation. Regional
governments are characterized by their abilities to deliver public goods (administra-
tive capacity) and to raise tax revenues (fiscal capacity). Two regimes are compared
on efficiency grounds. Under partial decentralization, regional governments rely on
central bailouts to complete local projects in financing needs. Under full decentraliza-
tion, marginal financing is achieved via local capital taxes. We show that the presence
of sufficiently low levels of administrative capacity is a necessary condition for full
decentralization dominance. This condition may also be sufficient, depending on the
projects’ characteristics. Some extensions are presented.
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1 Introduction
In many developed and developing countries, it is common that tax and expenditure
assignments to subnational or regional governments be unbalanced. In particular, re-
gional governments are often in charge of delivering local public services, but cannot
raise the required revenues to finance these expenditures. These so called “vertical fiscal
imbalances” should either be covered by centrally provided transfers, or just bypassed by
decentralizing tax powers to regional governments (see, e.g., Boadway and Shah (2007)).
The first alternative is widely used in practice and gives rise to an institutional setting
defined as partial decentralization (see Brueckner (2009)). Under this scenario, regional
governments may face “soft budget constraints,”1 which can create negative externalities
across regions and induce excessive spending or borrowing.2 To cope with this problem,
a vast literature has put forward different institutional mechanisms so that local authori-
ties face “hard budget constraints” (see, e.g., Rodden et al. (2003)). One mechanism that
has attracted significant attention is the complete decentralization of tax powers to sub-
national governments, or full decentralization. In a seminal contribution, Qian and Roland
(1998) argue that such a system gives rise to interregional tax competition, which in turn
raises the perceived marginal costs of public funds at the regional level. The benefits from
full decentralization have also been promoted by a number of international organizations,
including the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, and the World Bank (see
Gadenne and Singhal (2014) for a review).
But this conventional view on the advantages of decentralization has been challenged
on, at least, two grounds. First, hard budget constraints might generate inefficiencies
leading to underprovision of local projects (see Besfamille and Lockwood (2008)). Sec-
ond, pro-decentralization arguments usually ignore key institutional features molding
regional state capacity, defined as the state’s ability to execute policy3 (see Prud’homme
(1995), Bardhan (2002), and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006)). The goal of this paper is to
1According to Kornai et al. (2003), “A budget-constrained organization faces a hard budget constraint
as long as it does not receive support from other organizations to cover its deficit and is obliged to reduce
or cease its activity if the deficit persists. The soft budget constraint phenomenon occurs if one or more
supporting organizations are ready to cover all or part of the deficit” (page 1097).
2See Wildasin (1997) and Goodspeed (2002). On the empirical side, Pettersson-Lidbom (2010) finds that
by going from hard to soft budget constraints, local governments in Sweden increased their debt levels by
more than 20 percent on average between 1979 and 1992.
3This definition is in line with Besley and Persson (2010), who refer to state capacity as the “state’s ability
to implement a range of policies.” Within the political science literature, Mann (1984) defines state capacity
as the infrastructural power of the state to enforce policy within its territory. Snyder (2001) and Ziblatt
(2004, 2008) apply this concept to regional governments.
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integrate these elements into the normative comparison of partial and full decentraliza-
tion.
We consider an environment in which regional governments decide whether or not to
provide a discrete local public good or project. If the project is initiated, it is carried out
by regional bureaucracies, and may or may not require an additional round of refinanc-
ing to be completed. Initiated projects which do not require refinancing are said to be
completed early and generate a positive social benefit at the end of the initiation period.
Refinanced projects yield the same social benefit but at the end of the following period.
These projects are said to be completed late. Projects which remain incomplete produce
no social benefit in either period. Regional governments have just enough resources to
fund initiation costs, but need additional funds for refinancing projects. In the partially
decentralized regime, no regional government has tax powers to refinance its incomplete
project but the central government can bail out regions. Bailouts are financed via a uni-
form national tax on capital, which is imperfectly mobile. Under full decentralization,
on the other hand, regional governments have to refinance incomplete projects through a
tax on capital invested in their jurisdiction, in a context of tax competition. Equilibrium
outcomes under partial and full decentralization can be inefficient. In particular, the for-
mer can generate overprovision of projects, while the later can produce underprovision,
refinancing distortions, or other deadweight losses associated to tax competition. The
optimal institutional regime is the one that generates less inefficiencies in equilibrium.
Crucially, we distinguish between two dimensions of local state capacity: administra-
tive and fiscal (see Section 1.1). Administrative capacity measures the ability of subna-
tional governments to produce and deliver public goods and services, and it is proxied
by the probability that a project is finished early. Fiscal capacity gauges the ability to raise
revenues through local taxes, and it is modeled as the fraction of the potential tax base
that ends up as fiscal revenues of the subnational governments. The model is symmetric
ex ante, in the sense that all regional governments share the same level of state capacities,
and all costs and benefits are identical across regions. However, outcomes can be different
ex post because some projects might be completed earlier than others.
Our main results indicate how the optimal degree of decentralization hinges on the
relative magnitudes of each dimension of state ability. First, we show that when the
level of regional fiscal capacity that prevails in the federation is sufficiently low, partial
decentralization typically dominates.4 Basically, when fiscal ability is low, refinancing
4As explained in the body of the paper, this is always the case whenever expected refinancing costs are
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incomplete projects under full decentralization is too costly regardless of the level of re-
gional administrative capacity. Second, and more surprisingly, we find that the presence
of sufficiently low levels of administrative ability is a necessary condition for full decen-
tralization dominance. Moreover, when expected refinancing costs are high enough, such
a condition is also sufficient. The intuition for this second result is less clear cut, because
both institutional regimes generate inefficiencies when local governments lack high ad-
ministrative capacity. Nevertheless, we can still show that, in this case, the magnitude of
the distortions under full decentralization tends to be smaller than under partial decen-
tralization. The key mechanism is that tax competition distortions under full decentral-
ization can only emerge if at least one region needs no refinancing (so that equilibrium
capital flows are positive), but the likelihood of this event is small when the level of ad-
ministrative ability prevailing in the federation is low. This finding contradicts the views
of certain policy proposals suggesting that high levels of administrative capacity are nec-
essary for successful decentralization reforms (see, among others, Bird (1995) and Loayza
et al. (2014)).
We close by analyzing two extensions. The first extension incorporates imperfect fis-
cal capacity at the central level. We find that, somewhat counterintuitively, lower levels
of national fiscal ability might favor partial over full decentralization. While reducing
national fiscal capacity would lead costlier bailouts and underinvestment in partial de-
centralization, the number of inefficiently initiated projects would also decrease under
this system. Hence, for a given profile of regional state abilities, the overall effect on the
optimal regime choice is, in principle, ambiguous.
In the second extension, we relax the assumption by which the central government
can perfectly commit to full decentralization, i.e., we allow for the possibility of bailouts
under that system. We draw two major findings. First, perfect commitment is not a nec-
essary condition for our main results to go through. In particular, even in the presence
of uncertainty about the commitment capacity of the central government, full decentral-
ization dominates in a parametric area for administrative and fiscal capacities which is
analogous to the one in our base model. Second, we find that small deviations from per-
fect commitment of the center actually make full decentralization more attractive. This is
because lower commitment capacity at the central level also leads to smaller refinancing
inefficiencies under full decentralization.
also sufficiently low.
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1.1 Administrative vs. Fiscal Capacities: Background
Disaggregating state capacity into multiple dimensions is common place among political
scientists (see Hanson and Sigman (2013) or Cingolani et al. (2015) for surveys). Sckocpol
(1985), for example, argues that “(...) one of the most important facts about the power of a
state may be its unevenness across policy areas” (page 17). More recently, Soifer (2012) also
casts doubt on the validity of unidimensional measures of state capacity. In this paper, we
focus on two particular dimensions of regional state capacity, administrative and fiscal,
which shape the spending and taxing abilities of regional governments (authors within
political science usually isolate the coercive ability of the state as well, which we abstract
from).
The distinction between administrative and fiscal capacities relies either on case stud-
ies or on empirical work. Hanson (2015) provides an example of the first approach and
asserts that “(...) the coercive and extractive capacities of the Moroccan state are more
developed than its administrative professionalism” (page 327). The author mentions that
while Moroccan’s capacities to control its territory and to extract tax revenues unfolded
during the French colonial rule, its administrative ability still falls behind, as evidenced
by its high rates of infant mortality. On the empirical side, Gingerich (2013) argues that
national-level capacity measures do not properly approximate the capacity of state agen-
cies executing different functions. He uses survey data for Bolivia, Brazil, and Chile be-
tween 2003-2005.
The works just mentioned do not justify the disaggregation of state capacities at the
regional level. We partially address this issue in Appendix A. There we present an illus-
trative example for the U.S. States where the correlation between different measures of
regional administrative and fiscal capacities is weak.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper is related to various strands of literature. First, other contributions have
compared partially and fully decentralized regimes in different contexts. For example,
Brueckner (2009) uses a Tiebout-type model, while Peralta (2011) analyzes a political
economy setting in which local politicians can be either benevolent or rent-seekers. In
the former, full decentralization always dominates (where feasible) as it provides better
preference matching. In the latter, full decentralization is the preferred regime as long as
4
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the proportion of rent seekers is low.5 The main difference between our paper and these
contributions is that we study a different trade-off between partial and full decentraliza-
tion. That is, we identify the appropriate balance between inefficient bailouts and project
overprovision vs. capital tax competition and project underprovision. Moreover, neither
of the previous articles incorporate regional state capacity into the analysis.
The paper is also related to a set of contributions that analyze the advantages and
disadvantages of different types of regional budget constraints in federations. The opti-
mality of hard budget constraints has been studied by Qian and Roland (1998) and Inman
(2003); whereas the possibility that they may be inefficient has been raised by Besfamille
and Lockwood (2008). Our framework differs from the one in this last paper in, at least,
three important ways. First, our main focus is to study to what extent is fiscal decentral-
ization more/less desirable in the face of limited regional state capacity, which we break
down into two types. Besfamille and Lockwood (2008), on the other hand, do not analyze
how the optimal regime changes across different dimensions of regional state ability. Sec-
ond, unlike in that paper, we do not compare the performances of soft and hard budget
constraints, but of two fiscal decentralization regimes with well-defined allocations of tax
powers across central and regional governments. Finally, we compare regimes from an
ex ante perspective (i.e., before the uncertainty on the characteristics of local projects is
revealed), and not from an interim viewpoint, as that contribution does.
Wildasin (1997), Goodspeed (2002), Akai and Sato (2008) and Crivelli and Staal (2013)
describe how bailouts in federations distort, via a common-pool fiscal externality, deci-
sions at the regional level. Silva and Caplan (1997), Caplan et al. (2000), and Ko¨thenbu¨rger
(2004) claim that a regime with decentralized leadership, where the central government
sets intergovernmental transfers after regional governments have adopted their own pol-
icy, may give a more efficient outcome than a regime with hard budget constraints. This
result relies on a second best argument, and thus needs some pre-existing distortion in
the form of public goods or tax spillovers to hold. Sanguinetti and Tommasi (2004) an-
alyze the trade-off between hard and soft budget constraints, although in the “rules vs.
discretion” tradition.
5Other authors have considered environments where partial decentralization is the optimal regime, but
they adopt different definitions for partial decentralization. Janeba and Wilson (2011), and Hatfield and
Padro´ i Miquel (2012), for example, define partial decentralization as a regime in which a subset of public
goods are exclusively funded and provided by local governments. Joanis (2014), on the other hand, defines
partial decentralization as “shared responsibility,” that is, an institutional regime where both the central
and the regional government participate in the funding of a given public good.
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The layout of the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 analyzes the regime of partial decentralization. In Section 4 we study the equi-
librium under full decentralization. Section 5 analyzes the sources of inefficiencies under
each regime. Section 6 discusses the optimal regime and comparative statics. Section
7 presents the extensions with imperfect national fiscal capacity and imperfect commit-
ment, and Section 8 concludes. The main proofs are contained in the Appendix. Addi-
tional proofs and derivations are relegated to the Online Appendix.
2 The Model
The economy lasts for three periods, t = {1, 2, 3}, and is composed of L ≥ 2 regions
indexed by ℓ ∈ {1, ..., L}. Each region has a continuum (measure one) of risk-neutral, im-
mobile residents, each of whom has an endowment κ of capital. We consider a federation
with two levels of benevolent governments, central and regional, which choose policies
to maximize the sum of utilities of their residents over the three periods. Residents do not
discount future payoffs and derive utility from consumption of a nume´raire good in the
last period. The nume´raire is produced in every region by competitive firms that operate
a constant returns technology. Capital is the only input and units are chosen so that one
unit of capital produces one unit of output. Following Persson and Tabellini (1992), we
assume that capital can move between regions, but at a cost. Specifically, a resident of a
region that invests f units of capital in other region(s) incurs a mobility cost f 2/2.
Residents also derive utility from discrete local public goods, or projects, which are
provided by the regional governments. Projects require an initiation cost c0, and may or
may not require a second round of financing to be completed. The determination of the
refinancing round will be explained below.
Initiated projects which do not require additional funds to be finished yield a social
benefit b > 0 within a region at the end of the initiation period. Otherwise, projects gen-
erate no benefit in the initiation period and require an additional refinancing cost c to be
completed. This refinancing cost not only incorporates the technical cost of completion,
but also other costs on the population associated with the delay of the project (e.g., an
incomplete park may affect pedestrian movement).6 We assume that c is distributed ac-
cording to the probability density function h(c) with full support on [0, b]. If refinanced,
6Delays in local public works are prevalent both in developed and in developing countries. See Guccio
et al. (2014).
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the project generates social benefit b at the end of the following period; if not, the project
remains incomplete and produces no social benefit. It is worth emphasizing that, by con-
struction, c ≤ b; otherwise, continuation would never be optimal. Henceforth, we say
that a project is completed early (late) if it has been finished at the end of the initiation
(following) period. Project outcomes (i.e., whether projects are completed or not at the
end of the initiation period) are independent and observable across regions. For technical
reasons, we also assume that projects’ benefits are sufficiently large:
Assumption 1. b ≥ 2c0.
In words, we assume that the benefit-cost ratio is larger than two. This condition consid-
erably simplifies the analysis in the following sections.7
While all regional governments have just enough resources to pay for the initiation
cost c0, they need additional revenue to fund the continuation cost c. We consider two
institutional regimes, depending on which level of government makes the continuation
decision for projects which need to be refinanced. Under partial decentralization (PD), the
central government decides on refinancing incomplete projects through a uniform tax τ
on the national stock of capital. Under full decentralization (FD), continuation decisions are
made by regional governments. To refinance, local authorities use a per unit tax levied on
capital invested in their regions at the rate τℓ.
2.1 Regional State Capacities
Regional governments are characterized by two dimensions of state capacity: administra-
tive and fiscal. The former measures the ability of regional bureaucracies to deliver public
goods, and is encapsulated by the probability of completing a project early π ∈ [0, 1].8
In contrast, fiscal capacity gauges the ability to collect tax revenues. This is summarized
by the fraction of the potential tax base which can actually be collected via regional taxes,
7 Under Assumption 1, the equilibrium expected welfare curve under partial decentralization becomes
linear and increasing in administrative capacity π. This feature simplifies the characterization of the opti-
mal regimes across (π, θ), and it is the main reason why Assumption 1 is made (see Section 2 in the Online
Appendix for a discussion). Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that a benefit-cost ratio larger than two
is a fairly plausible figure. For example, according to the “Construction Performance Guidelines,” the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers only funds projects which economic return displays a benefit-cost ratio of 2.5-to-1
or higher (calculated at a 7-percent discount rate). See http://cdm16021.contentdm.oclc.org.
8 Loayza et al. (2014) quantitatively evaluate how local capacity affects municipal budget execution rates
in Peru, among other things. Patil et al. (2013) document that public projects’ delays in Indian states are
mainly caused by administrative problems that arise during the land acquisition process.
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Figure 1: Timing in the model. Values in terminal nodes represent the benefit of the
project. iℓ = I (= NI) if region ℓ initiates (does not initiate the project). rℓ = R (= NR) if
region ℓ refinances (does not refinance the project).
henceforth denoted θ ∈ [0, 1]. All regional governments share the same exogenous levels
of state capacities π and θ.9
2.2 Timing
The order of events is as follows. At t = 1, a political body (e.g., the Congress) chooses the
type of tax decentralization, i.e., PD or FD. At the beginning of t = 2, the refinancing cost
c (common across regions) is realized, and regional governments decide whether or not
to initiate projects. Projects are completed early with probability π and generate payoff b
at the end of this period.
At the beginning of t = 3, central or regional governments (depending on the insti-
tutional regime in place) decide whether to shut down or continue projects in financing
needs. Once taxes are set, capital owners invest in the region(s) with the highest net
return(s), central or regional governments raise their taxes, production takes place, and
private consumption (net of mobility costs) occurs.10 Projects which are completed late
yield social benefit b at the end of period t = 3. We summarize the timing in Figure 1.
9Our model focuses on the role of initial conditions regarding state capacity in the choice of the optimal
decentralization regime. We leave aside the question of how different decentralization regimes influence
state capacity formation.
10Such a timing is also common in the literature on tax competition. See Wilson (1999) for a survey.
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2.3 Discussion
Before putting the model to work, we discuss some of its features.
Local Capital Taxes. Our focus on capital taxes at the local level is in line with Qian and
Roland (1998) and with the bulk of the literature on tax competition, following Zodrow
and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986). Subnational capital taxes are also widespread
in practice. One reason is that property tax codes (e.g., in the US) do not commonly dis-
tinguish between the values of capital and land when assessing the tax base (see Wilson
(1999)). Other local fiscal instruments beyond property taxes are sometimes regarded
as taxes on mobile capital as well. This interpretation applies to the local business tax
(Gewerbesteuer) in Germany, which is the main source of tax revenue for German munici-
palities.
Central Government Features. Certain characteristics of the central authority in our
model deserve further comment. First, along the lines of the seminal contribution of Oates
(1972), we assume that national taxation under partial decentralization is uniform across
regions. As common in the literature following Oates (1972), if one allowed national taxes
to be non-uniform (for example, if taxes were contingent on the regions requiring addi-
tional funds), the central government would be able to replicate the first best outcome.
But if that was the case, it would certainly be pointless to compare partial and full de-
centralization, which is one of the main goals of this paper. The assumption of uniform
national taxation has a counterpart in many federal countries where, due to constitutional
reasons, national taxes (like the income tax or the VAT) are required to be set uniformly
across subnational governments.11
Second, the central government cannot deliver local public projects. Put differently,
expenditure powers are fully decentralized. This assumption is motivated by the empiri-
cal fact that tax autonomy is much less decentralized than expenditure authority. Across
OECD countries, for example, the sub-central share of consolidated government expendi-
ture averaged around 33% in 2014, while the sub-central share in total own revenue was
only about 19% for that year (these shares were relatively stable over the last two decades;
see OECD/KIPF (2016)).
Third, in our baseline model we assume that the central authority is fully efficient
along its fiscal ability, and that it can perfectly commit not to bailout regions under FD.
11Among developed countries, U.S., Australia, and Switzerland incorporate uniformity of national taxa-
tion explicitly in their constitutions. Analogous examples among developing countries include Argentina,
Brazil, and South Africa.
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These two assumptions are relaxed in Sections 7.1 and 7.2, respectively.
Nature of Public Projects. We consider a discrete, regional public project, instead of a
continuous public good as it is common in most of the literature on tax competition.12
Examples of discrete public goods abound in reality. In fact, many infrastructure projects,
such as bridges, tunnels, roads, airports, or stations, can be considered discrete. From
a technical standpoint, indivisibility fixes the type of competition between regions. As
in Wildasin (1988), regions compete in refinancing decisions first, and then taxes are set
accordingly in a context of imperfect capital mobility.13 Moreover, this assumption com-
bined with our specification of administrative competence is a simple way to analyze,
via refinancing decisions, the interaction between levels of regional state capacity and
different intergovernmental fiscal arrangements.
It is also worth stressing that the realization of the refinancing cost c is unknown in the
first period. We make this assumption to introduce uncertainty around the characteristics
of the projects when the institutional regime is chosen. We believe this is a realistic feature,
since decentralization regimes are not typically project-based. Moreover, in a repeated
version of the model, changing the institutional regime after each realization of c would
be too costly.
Finally, even though projects in the model are ex ante and interim identical, they are
ex post heterogeneous. Ex ante (i.e., in period 1), projects share the same social benefit b,
investment cost c0, and probability density function h(c). Interim (i.e., at the beginning
of period 2), the cost c is realized and applies to all projects in all regions alike. Ex post,
though, heterogeneity is possible since project outcomes can be different across regions.
3 Partial Decentralization
This section studies the partially decentralized regime. Given that c ≤ b by construc-
tion, incomplete projects are always refinanced by the central government under this
regime. Consequently, project initiation decisions of any given region may ultimately
impact other regions. This gives rise to a simultaneous game between regions in the sec-
ond period (i.e., when the initial investment decision is made).
12Cremer et al. (1997), Lockwood (2002), and Besfamille and Lockwood (2008) are other contributions to
the local public finance literature which deal with discrete projects.
13Akai and Sato (2008) and Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2011) also analyze models with this timing, but they consider
income or wage taxation instead.
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Let iℓ ∈ {I, NI} denote region ℓ’s initiation decision, where I (NI) denotes initiation
(no initiation). Region ℓ’s expected welfare at the beginning of the second period is given
by
EWPD
ℓ
(iℓ, im) = κ(1− τ
e) + 1I{iℓ=I}[b− c0], (1)
where im is the vector of investment decisions adopted by all other regions m 6= ℓ, 1I{iℓ=I}
is equal to 1 if region ℓ has initiated the project and to 0 otherwise, and τe is the expected
tax, which satisfies:
τeLκ =
[
∑
ℓ
1I{iℓ=I}(1− π)
]
c, (2)
where the term in square brackets gives the expected number of bailouts.14
Substituting (2) into (1) and rearranging, we obtain
EWPD
ℓ
(iℓ, im) = κ + 1I{iℓ=I}
[
b− c0 − (1− π)
c
L
]
− (1− π)
c
L ∑
m 6=ℓ
1I{im=I}· (3)
By inspection of (3), the effect of iℓ on EW
PD
ℓ
(captured by the term in square brackets) is
independent of im. Hence, we can analyze the choice of iℓ by focusing on a representative
region ℓ. Additionally, it is worth noting that each region only pays 1/L of the cost of
refinancing its incomplete project, as this cost is shared through national taxation. In this
sense, the central government’s budget constraint generates a common-pool fiscal external-
ity: any resident of ℓ is negatively affected by the possibility of an incomplete project in
region m 6= ℓ.
The next proposition characterizes project initiation decisions under partial decentral-
ization.
Proposition 1. Consider the project initiation game under PD. The unique equilibrium in dom-
inant strategies is such that all regions initiate projects.
14The expected tax τe is obtained as follows. Let ω be a profile of project outcomes at the end of t = 2 ,
and denote by nω the corresponding number of completed projects. For a given profile ω, at the beginning
of t = 3 the central government sets a tax τω to cover the cost of refinancing ∑ℓ 1I{iℓ=I} − nω incomplete
projects. As this tax is uniform and exporting capital is costly, every household will invest in its own region.
This implies that the tax base is Lκ and that national taxation is non-distortionary, since the aggregate
capital stock is fixed. Hence, under profile ω, the central government’s budget constraint is
τωLκ =
[
∑
ℓ
1I{iℓ=I} − nω
]
c,
and the expected tax is given by τe = Eωτω.
11
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
The proof relies on the fact that, as long as b ≥ 2c0 and L ≥ 2, initiating the project is a
dominant strategy regardless of the value of c.
4 Full Decentralization
Having described partial decentralization, we now turn to analyze the fully decentral-
ized regime. In this case, a three-stage simultaneous game between regions emerges.
First, regional governments take the initial investment decision. Second, the continuation
decision is made. Finally, refinancing is achieved by levying regional capital taxes, in a
context of tax competition. We solve this game by backwards induction.
4.1 Tax Competition
Before characterizing the equilibrium in tax rates, it will be convenient to describe how
capital is allocated based on a tax profile τ = {τ1, ..., τL}. The household’s investment
decision can be summarized as follows:
Lemma 1. Let fℓm denote the amount of capital that residents of region ℓ invest in region m 6= ℓ,
and let τ˜ℓ ≡ min{τm}m 6=ℓ be the minimum tax rate across all regions excluding ℓ.
1. If region ℓ sets its capital tax above the minimum tax rate, τℓ ≥ τ˜ℓ, region ℓ experiences
capital outflows in the amount ∑m 6=ℓ fℓm = τℓ − τ˜ℓ ≥ 0. Moreover, capital only flows from
ℓ towards the regions setting the minimum tax rate, so that fℓm = 0 if τm 6= τ˜ℓ.
2. If region ℓ sets its capital tax strictly below the minimum tax rate, τℓ < τ˜ℓ, region ℓ experi-
ences no capital outflows, so that fℓm = 0 for all m 6= ℓ.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
According to Lemma 1, the household’s portfolio decision is fully determined by com-
paring τℓ only against τ˜ℓ, and not against the whole profile of tax rates chosen by regions
m 6= ℓ. In particular, the size of the total capital outflow from a given region is indepen-
dent of the number of regions with zero capital tax rates.15 It should also be noted that
15 Two assumptions underlie this result: constant marginal productivity of capital, and the fact that mo-
bility costs are independent of the distribution of capital flows. Relaxing either of these assumptions could
lead to capital outflows being linked to the number of regions with zero taxes. This would substantially
increase the complexity of the characterization of the FD regime.
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capital inflows to region ℓ do not benefit residents of ℓ directly. This is because the returns
from these investments are consumed abroad, and there is no immobile production factor.
The following proposition characterizes the equilibria of the tax competition subgame:
Proposition 2. Consider the tax competition subgame under FD. Nash equilibria are as follows:
1. If all regions refinance incomplete projects, then the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies is such that all regions set the tax rate τℓ = c/(θκ) ≡ τ
sym
ℓ
.
2. Otherwise, all ℓ-regions that refinance set the tax rate
τ
asym
ℓ
≡
1
2
[
κ −
√
κ2 − (4c/θ)
]
.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
Consider the tax competition subgame that emerges when all regions have decided to
refinance their incomplete projects. In this case, all regions set τ
sym
ℓ
= c/(θκ) in equilib-
rium, which corresponds to the rate that regional governments would choose in autarky.
By Lemma 1, this implies that there are no capital flows in equilibrium. Moreover, imper-
fect fiscal capacity (i.e., θ < 1) implies that regions do not only have to cover the technical
cost of completing the project c, but a higher effective refinancing cost c/θ.
The proposition also shows that, when at least one region does not refinance, asym-
metric taxation emerges in equilibrium, as in Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991).16 Just
like τ
sym
ℓ
, the tax rate τ
asym
ℓ
decreases with θ, but it is strictly greater than τ
sym
ℓ
,17 and it
leads to a capital outflow in the amount ∑m 6=ℓ fℓm = τ
asym
ℓ
. Regional welfare in equilib-
rium if the region refinances is thus
WFD
ℓ
= κ − c0 + b−
[
c
θ
+
(τ
asym
ℓ
)2
2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ T(c,θ)
,
16The main difference with their result is that variations in tax rates across regions are not originated from
ex ante regional asymmetries. Instead, asymmetric taxation emerges here because some regions may end
up with incomplete projects ex post.
17The intuition behind τ
asym
ℓ
> τ
sym
ℓ
is that if the tax base erodes due to capital outflows, refinancing
regions can only increase their tax rates to meet the refinancing cost c.
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where T(c, θ) measures the total refinancing cost. This cost incorporates the effective refi-
nancing cost c/θ and the deadweight loss (τ
asym
ℓ
)2/2, which arises due to capital mobility.
Importantly, the likelihood of having positive capital flows in equilibrium depends upon
the level of regional administrative capacity π.
4.2 Refinancing Decision
Next we analyze the Nash equilibria which emerges at the beginning of t = 3. At that
stage, regional governments play a refinancing subgame in which each region decides
whether to shut down or continue incomplete projects.
To proceed, we need to define the cutoff costs c1(θ) and c2(θ), which are linked to the
level of fiscal capacity θ. The threshold c1(θ) equalizes the project’s benefit b and the total
refinancing cost T(c, θ) faced when at least one region does not refinance. c2(θ), on the
other hand, is the break-even cost that balances b and the total refinancing cost c/θ faced
when all regions refinance. Clearly, c2(θ) > c1(θ) because, when some region does not
refinance, capital flight adds a deadweight loss. Proposition 3 characterizes equilibria of
the refinancing game.
Proposition 3. Consider the refinancing subgame under FD. Depending on the realization of the
refinancing cost c, Nash equilibria are as follows:
1. If c < c1(θ), regions facing incomplete projects refinance.
2. If c > c2(θ), regions facing incomplete projects do not refinance.
3. Otherwise, regions facing incomplete projects refinance if and only if all regions face incom-
plete projects.
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
In the first and second cases, refinancing and not refinancing, respectively, are dominant
strategies. This follows from the definitions of c1(θ) and c2(θ).
Now consider the third case, under which c1(θ) ≤ c ≤ c2(θ). When at least one
region has completed a project early, no region refinances. This is because c ≥ c1(θ), so
that the benefit would not cover the total refinancing cost including deadweight losses.
When all regions face incomplete projects, on the other hand, a coordination game with
two possible Nash equilibria emerges: either all regions refinance, or no region does. In
the first equilibrium, there are no capital flows and, hence, no deadweight losses due to
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distortionary taxation. However, if at least one region decided not to refinance, the other
regions would also shut down their projects since c ≥ c1(θ), which leads to the second
equilibrium. We select the Nash equilibrium in which all regions refinance because it is
the only one which is strong in the sense of Aumann (1959).
A key difference with the PD regime is that not all incomplete projects are being refi-
nanced under FD. The reason is that, in contrast to national taxation, regional taxation is
distortionary. Particularly, regional taxation gives rise to deadweight losses due to two as-
sumptions: factor mobility and imperfect fiscal capacity. To clarify this point, it is helpful
to see how departing from either of those assumptions would impact the cost thresholds
featured in Proposition 3. If the taxable factor was immobile, the local tax base would
be fixed at the capital endowment κ, and refinancing regions would set the autarky tax
τℓ = c/(θκ). Hence, the cost threshold c1(θ) would coincide with c2(θ). On the other
hand, if local fiscal capacity was perfect (i.e., if θ = 1) we would have c2(θ) = b. Alto-
gether, capital immobility coupled with θ = 1 would yield c1(θ) = c2(θ) = b. In that case,
all incomplete projects would be refinanced, as regional governments would have access
to non-distortionary taxation.
4.3 Project Initiation
We close this section by discussing the project initiation decision under FD.
Proposition 4. Consider the project initiation game under FD. Given administrative and fiscal
capacities (π, θ), there exists a threshold cFD(π, θ) such that initial investment takes place in all
regions if and only if the refinancing cost satisfies c ≤ cFD(π, θ). Otherwise, no region invests in
equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix B.5.
For a given level of the refinancing cost, the initiation decision under FD is shaped by
the configuration of fiscal and administrative capacities. This establishes a key differ-
ence between PD and FD regimes: while under the former all projects are initiated (see
Proposition 1), only some of them receive initial funding under the latter.
To conclude this section, Figure 2 summarizes the content of Proposition 3 and Propo-
sition 4, i.e., refinancing and initiation decisions under FD. To draw this picture, we
assume that sufficient conditions for cFD(π, θ) to be increasing in π hold, and that the
intercept of this cost threshold is below c1(θ).
18 We should also note that when π ≥ c0/b,
18See Appendix B.5 for details. Neither of these assumptions are essential to our results.
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Figure 2: Investment and refinancing decisions under full decentralization as a function
of state capacities (π, θ), the refinancing cost c, and other parameters.
the initial investment cost is smaller than the expected return from initiating a project
and shutting it down if it needs refinancing. In that case, investment at t = 2 is optimal
regardless of the realization of c.
5 Interim Inefficiencies
The ultimate goal of this paper is to provide a normative comparison between partial
and full decentralization from an ex ante perspective, i.e., before the refinancing cost c is
realized. As pointed out previously, we adopt such a criterion to introduce uncertainty
around the characteristics of the projects at the constitutional stage (see Section 2.3). In
this section, we take a preliminary step towards understanding the ex ante comparison
between regimes. Specifically, for each regime, we isolate the sources of interim inefficien-
cies emerging for a given realization of c. This exercise allows us to build intuition, which
we carry over to the remainder of the paper.
5.1 First Best
We begin by analyzing the first best benchmark. Consider a social planner who maxi-
mizes the sum of utilities of the residents in the federation. The planner makes all deci-
sions, but cannot anticipate whether a project will be completed at the end of t = 2 (she
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has to carry out projects through the regional bureaucracies).
Due to risk neutrality and the fact that the planner maximizes the sum of utilities, opti-
mal refinancing decisions are independent across regions. Hence, continuing incomplete
projects is always optimal because c ≤ b. Moving back to the initial investment decision,
the planner initiates projects provided their expected benefit is higher than their expected
cost (which includes a possible second round of financing). Let
c∗(π) ≡
b− c0
1− π
denote the refinancing cost that makes the net expected regional payoff from initiating a
project equal to zero. The efficient investment rule follows immediately from the defini-
tion of c∗(π):
Lemma 2. For any given region, initial investment is efficient if and only if the refinancing cost
satisfies c ≤ c∗(π).
5.2 Partial Decentralization
Proposition 1 and Lemma 2 imply the following:
Corollary 1. Under PD, regions may invest in equilibrium when it is inefficient to do so.
Inefficiencies under PD involve overinvestment. This result is driven by the well known
common-pool fiscal externality (see Wildasin (1997) and Goodspeed (2002)). The hori-
zontally striped area in Figure 3a depicts overinvestment inefficiencies under PD. For
π ≥ c0/b, PD replicates first best initiation decisions for all c. When π < c0/b initiation
decisions are optimal provided c ≤ c∗(π). Otherwise, projects are initiated under PD
despite of generating negative expected payoff in equilibrium.
5.3 Full Decentralization
It can be shown that the cost threshold cFD(π, θ) defined in Proposition 4 is below c∗(π).
As a consequence, the FD regime displays the following types of inefficiencies:
Corollary 2. Under FD, equilibrium outcomes can be inefficient for three reasons:
1. Regions do not make initial investments in equilibrium when it is efficient to do so.
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Figure 3: Interim inefficiencies under each regime: overinvestment (horizontally striped
area), underinvestment (vertically striped area), no refinancing (dotted area), and distor-
tionary refinancing (grey area).
2. Incomplete projects are not refinanced in equilibrium when it is efficient to do so.
3. Refinancing incomplete projects generates deadweight losses.
Proof. See Appendix B.6.
Figure 3b illustrates the types of interim inefficiencies under the FD regime.19 The striped
area corresponds to the underinvestment inefficiency, as per case 1 in Corollary 2. Cases
2 and 3 are represented with a dotted pattern and with a grey background, respectively.
Notably, when c1(θ) ≤ c ≤ c2(θ), either case 2 or case 3 can emerge, depending on the
profile of project outcomes at the end of t = 2 (see Proposition 3).
The third type of inefficiency in Corollary 2 deserves further comment. As explained
in Section 4.2, deadweight losses from regional taxation can emerge for two reasons. First,
since local tax authorities have imperfect fiscal capacity, they need to collect at least c/θ >
c to refinance a project. Second, interregional capital mobility may render local capital
taxes distortionary too. When c < c1(θ), both of these channels can operate. When
c1(θ) ≤ c ≤ c2(θ) and all regions refinance, only the first channel is at work.
19The first and second types of inefficiencies resemble analogous results in Zodrow and Mieszkowski
(1986) and Besfamille and Lockwood (2008), respectively. It is also worth noting that FD would replicate
the first best if capital was immobile and fiscal capacity was perfect. In that case, regional taxation would
be non-distortionary, as discussed in Section 4.2. As a consequence, all incomplete projects would be re-
financed and regions would only initiate projects which yield positive net expected payoffs (so that the
relevant cost threshold would be c∗(π), as in the first best).
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6 Optimal Institutional Regime
The institutional choice between partial and full decentralization takes place in the initial
period, before the realization of the refinancing cost c. Knowing the values of all other
parameters in the model, the Congress at this stage chooses the regime that maximizes
expected welfare in equilibrium. Next we evaluate how the optimal regime choice is
affected by the levels of regional state capacity (π, θ).
Let EŴR(π, θ) denote the equilibrium level of expected welfare at time t = 1 under
regime R ∈ {PD, FD}, given state capacities (π, θ).20 The comparison between EŴFD
and EŴPD across (π, θ) is not a priori evident. On the one hand, higher values of θ
would push for FD dominance since EŴFD increases and EŴPD remains constant when
θ grows. On the other hand, expected welfare under both regimes can increase with π.21
The next proposition characterizes the optimal regime.
Proposition 5. There exists a unique frontier π̂(θ) ∈ [0, c0/b) which increases with fiscal ca-
pacity θ, such that FD dominates if and only if administrative and fiscal capacities (π, θ) satisfy
π ≤ π̂(θ). Moreover, if the expected refinancing cost c¯ ≡
´
c h(c)dc is higher than (b− c0), then
π̂(0) > 0 and, hence, FD dominates for all θ if π is sufficiently low.
Proof. See Appendix B.7.
Figure 4 illustrates these results. In either panel, a point in the (θ,π) plane represents a
particular configuration of regional state capacities in the federation. FD is the preferred
regime below the frontier π̂(θ). PD dominates elsewhere except at π = 1, where both
regimes replicate the first best and, hence, are equivalent. By Proposition 5, we can isolate
two scenarios depending on whether the expected refinancing cost c¯ is above or below
(b − c0). In particular, if c¯ < b − c0 the locus π̂(θ) crosses the horizontal axis at θ0 > 0,
as in the left panel. We also include the threshold π = c0/b in the figures to facilitate
intuition in the next discussion.
Consider Figure 4a and assume that π < c0/b. As expected, FD is optimal only when
regional fiscal capacity is relatively high: when θ < θ0, refinancing incomplete projects
under FD is too costly, so PD dominates. More surprisingly, FD dominance also requires
20It is clear that EŴPD(π, θ) = EŴPD(π) for all θ. We only leave a latent dependency on θ under PD to
reduce notation.
21The function EŴFD(π, θ) is continuous, almost everywhere differentiable, and convex in π. For rela-
tively low values of π, EŴFD(π, θ) can increase or decrease with this parameter, but when administrative
capacity is high enough, EŴFD(π, θ) always increases with π. Regarding EŴPD(π), this is a continuous,
linear, and increasing function of π. See Appendix B.7 and the Online Appendix for details.
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Figure 4: Optimal regime choice as a function of state capacities (π, θ). Full decentraliza-
tion dominates to the southwest of the frontier π̂(θ). When π = 1, both regimes replicate
the first best.
that regional administrative capacity be sufficiently low, i.e., π ≤ π̂(θ). The intuition can
be grasped by comparing the inefficiencies in Corollaries 1 and 2 over this parametric
region. First, when π is low and θ is sufficiently high, it is more likely that PD generates
overinvestment inefficiencies, than that FD generates underinvestment distortions (see
Figure 3). Second, for low π the likelihood of creating refinancing and tax distortion
inefficiencies under FD is low. Essentially, those distortions can only emerge if at least
one region needs no refinancing. But that is a low probability event when π is small.
When π is above c0/b, the model is biased towards project initiation. In this case, PD
outcomes are efficient (see Figure 3a), while under FD the probability of facing capital
mobility costs or not refinancing projects is positive. Thus, PD dominates. In the limit,
when π is equal to one, no project needs to be refinanced and both regimes yield optimal
outcomes.
In Figure 4b, we consider the case in which the expected value of the refinancing cost c
is larger than b− c0. Unlike in the previous scenario, FD now dominates for all θ provided
π is low enough. Put differently, the presence of low enough levels of administrative
capacity is a sufficient condition for full decentralization dominance. The underlying
mechanism is transparent when π = 0 and θ > 0. In that case, all projects are initiated and
refinanced under PD, despite of generating negative expected payoffs (i.e., b − c0 − c <
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0). In contrast, only some projects are initiated under FD, so this regime dominates.
Continuity implies that FD is optimal for relatively low values of π.
Summing up, these results clarify how the different dimensions of regional state ca-
pacity shape the trade-off between PD and FD. In particular, contrary to the view held
by some authors,22 high levels of administrative and fiscal capacity do not necessarily
imply that FD is optimal. Instead, the presence of relatively low levels of administrative
capacity stands out as a necessary condition for FD dominance.
6.1 Comparative Statics
In this subsection we analyze how changes in the key parameters of the model affect the
comparison between partial and full decentralization. These results are summarized in
Figure 5. Proofs corresponding to this section are contained in the Online Appendix.
Changing the capital endowment κ. A decrease in κ always favors PD, in the sense
that this regime would dominate in a larger area of the plane (θ,π). The intuition for
this result hinges on two facts. First, the cost of distortions generated under PD does
not depend upon the value of κ. Second, a decrease in κ increases τ
asym
ℓ
and the capital
mobility costs under FD.
Changing the project’s benefit b. When b increases, overinvestment inefficiencies un-
der PD increase less than the corresponding inefficiencies due to underinvestment with
FD. Hence, an increase in b pushes for PD dominance.
Changing the number of regions L. Two opposing effects are triggered when increas-
ing L. First, under PD, the common-pool fiscal externality gets larger, which leads to
more projects being inefficiently initiated. Second, the likelihood of bearing deadweight
losses under FD (either due to capital mobility or due to shutting down projects) also
increases. It can be shown that the latter outweighs the former, so that an increase in L
favors PD.
22See, among others, Bird (1995) and Loayza et al. (2014).
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Figure 5: Effect of decreasing the capital endowment κ, increasing the project’s benefit b,
or increasing the number of regions L on the frontier π̂(θ).
7 Extensions
7.1 Imperfect National Fiscal Capacity
In this section we drop the assumption by which the central government has perfect fis-
cal capacity. Specifically, we now assume that the central government can only collect a
fraction θ̂ < 1 of its potential tax base. While this change does not affect the FD regime, it
does change the outcomes and interim inefficiencies under PD, as depicted in Figure 6.23
Figure 6a shows that two differences with the benchmark model emerge. First, not all
projects are initiated anymore (see upper left corner). Second, not all incomplete projects
are refinanced (upper right corner). Indeed, incomplete projects are only bailed out when-
ever c ≤ θ̂b. As a consequence of those novel outcomes, the inefficiency spectrum is now
much richer and contains four types of distortions, as shown in Figure 6b: overinvestment
(horizontally striped area), underinvestment (vertically striped area), no refinancing (dot-
ted area), and refinancing by incurring deadweight losses (grey background).24
In the Online Appendix we prove that our main result is robust to the presence of im-
23The figures are drawn assuming that θ̂ ≥ 1 − c0/b, which allows one to consider all possible cases
of distortions. Refer to the Online Appendix for a formal characterization of the project initiation and
refinancing decisions as depicted in Figure 6a.
24The last region emerges because the central government needs to collect c/θ̂ > c to refinance incomplete
projects.
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Figure 6: Partial decentralization under imperfect national fiscal capacity θ̂ < 1. Interim
inefficiencies in the right panel are: overinvestment (horizontally striped area), under-
investment (vertically striped area), no refinancing (dotted area), and distortionary refi-
nancing (grey area).
perfect national fiscal capacity. Specifically, even for θ̂ < 1, a combination of low levels of
administrative capacity and high levels of regional fiscal capacity calls for fully decentral-
izing tax powers. Notwithstanding, changes to the level of national fiscal capacity affect
the optimal regime in a non-trivial way. The next proposition illustrates this result.
Proposition 6. If regional administrative capacity π is close to zero and national fiscal capacity
θ̂ is close to one, a small reduction in θ̂ can benefit PD over FD.
Proof. See Appendix B.8.
The content of Proposition 6 is illustrated in Figure 7. Suppose θ̂ decreases. On the one
hand, this should favor FD since PD would lead to costlier bailouts, and larger distortions
from underinvestment and from not refinancing incomplete projects. However, for low
values of π, the number of projects which are inefficiently initiated in PD also decreases
as θ̂ drops (the horizontally striped area in Figure 6b shrinks). As this latter favors PD, the
overall effect of lowering the level of national fiscal capacity is, in principle, ambiguous.
Panel 7a displays a case in which the channels favoring FD dominate unambiguously.
Panel 7b shows the converse. As shown in Appendix B.8, this last case can occur if,
among other things, the density h(c) concentrates sufficient mass on the highest value of
its domain, which is b.
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Figure 7: Decreasing national fiscal capacity θ̂. In Scenario I, decreasing θ̂ below one
unambiguously favors full decentralization. In Scenario II, such a reduction in θ̂ favors
partial decentralization when regional administrative capacity π is low.
7.2 Imperfect Commitment Capacity
In the baseline model we assume that the central government can perfectly commit not
to bailout regions under FD. As this need not be the case for some countries (see Rodden
et al. (2003)), in this section we analyze the consequences of relaxing that assumption.
7.2.1 Extended Environment
We start by introducing bailout uncertainty into our baseline framework along the lines
of Inman (2003) or Dovis and Kirpalani (2017). As a first step, we reinterpret the full and
partial decentralization regimes in the following way: Assume that the central govern-
ment keeps its tax powers under either regime but, differently from PD, the FD system
gives tax powers to the regions and incorporates a “no bailout” clause in the Constitu-
tion. Such a clause prevents the central government from transferring resources across
regions to refinance incomplete projects. While this reinterpretation does not change the
outcomes of our benchmark model, it allows us to formalize the notion of imperfect com-
mitment next.25
25In Section 7.2.4 we enrich the analysis by allowing the Congress to choose over tax decentralization and
over incorporating or not a “no bailout” clause in the Constitution.
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Suppose that there are two possible types of central government: a committed type, and
an uncommitted type. The former abides by the “no bailout” clause in the Constitution
(if any), while the latter does not. Only the central government can observe its type,
which is not revealed until the refinancing stage. Bailouts, therefore, are uncertain when
regions make investment decisions. We let η ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability that the central
government is a committed type.
We modify the timing in Section 2.2 as follows. Now we add a new period, t = 0, in
which the central government learns its type. Then the sequence of events is the same as
before, until the refinancing stage (t = 3). At the beginning of that period, the commit-
ment type of the center is revealed. Subsequently, central or regional authorities are in
charge of refinancing, depending on the decentralization system at hand. If the center is
uncommitted, refinancing decisions under FD are made in sequence: regions move first,
and then the central government follows.26 The equilibrium of the refinancing stage is
discussed below.
In this environment, η can be interpreted as the commitment capacity of the central
government, as perceived by the Congress and by the regional authorities. Importantly,
such commitment capacity is independent of the federal system (FD or PD) chosen by
the Congress. Our benchmark formulation is nested for η = 1.
7.2.2 Equilibria under PD and FD
Under PD, the underlying type of the central government is irrelevant because the Con-
stitution does not incorporate a “no bailout” clause. Therefore, the corresponding equi-
librium is the same as in the baseline model: all projects are initiated and bailed out, if
necessary. In what follows, we focus on how imperfect commitment capacity changes the
equilibrium outcomes of the FD regime.
Consider period t = 3. Under FD, there are two possibilities. If the center is uncom-
mitted, regions with incomplete projects would not refinance, anticipating that the central
government would always bail them out. The reason is that regions only bear a part of the
refinancing cost and central bailouts are ex post optimal (because c ≤ b and central taxes
generate no distortions due to the inelastic supply of capital at the national level). If the
center is committed, on the other hand, regions should decide upon refinancing via local
capital taxes. In this case, the results of Proposition 3 hold. That is, the same cost thresh-
olds c1(θ) and c2(θ) stratify the range of c into refinancing and non-refinancing areas, as
26This timing resembles the one in Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2004).
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Figure 8: Project initiation threshold under full decentralization given commitment ca-
pacity η ∈ [0, 1]. The investment area below the threshold cFD(π, θ, η) increases as η is
reduced.
a function of the profile of incomplete projects across regions.
The main difference with the FD system in our baseline framework occurs at the
project initiation stage, t = 2. In Appendix B.9 we show that given (π, θ, η), there ex-
ists a threshold cFD(π, θ, η) such that initial investment takes place in all regions if and
only if c ≤ cFD(π, θ, η). Otherwise, no region invests in equilibrium. This result is the
analogue of Proposition 4, with the added feature that the relevant cost threshold now
depends on η. In the Appendix we also show that cFD(π, θ, η) actually decreases with η,
as illustrated in Figure 8. That is, the investment area expands as η is reduced. Intuitively,
lower values of η imply that there is a higher probability that incomplete projects will be
refinanced by the center without distortion. This provides more incentives for the regions
to invest.
7.2.3 Optimal Institutional Regime
We divide the analysis of the optimal regime into two parts: small deviations and large
deviations from perfect commitment (η = 1). While we can provide analytical results for
the first part, we can only rely on numerical simulations for the last one.
Small Deviations from Perfect Commitment. The next proposition establishes how the
choice of the optimal regime changes as η decreases slightly from the benchmark case
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with η = 1.
Proposition 7. Suppose that the central government commits not to bailout regions under FD
with probability η.
1. In a neighborhood of η = 1, there exists a frontier π̂(θ, η) such that FD dominates if and
only if administrative and fiscal capacities (π, θ) satisfy π ≤ π̂(θ, η). The frontier π̂(θ, η)
is unique, it increases with θ, and is such that π̂(0, η) > 0 when the expected refinancing
cost c is sufficiently high.
2. Small deviations from perfect commitment capacity favor FD dominance, in the sense that
the frontier π̂(θ, η) satisfies limη→1 ∂π̂(θ, η)/∂η ≤ 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.9.
Part 1 extends Proposition 5. It shows that perfect commitment is not a necessary condi-
tion for our main results to go through: even when η = 1− ε with ε small, FD dominates
in a parametric area for (θ,π) which is analogous to the one in our base model. Partic-
ularly, FD is still preferred when π is sufficiently low and, under certain conditions, this
result is unrelated to the value of θ.
By Part 2, small deviations from perfect commitment of the central government ac-
tually make the FD regime more attractive. A second best mechanism underlies this re-
sult. Basically, decreasing the commitment capacity of the central government can also
decrease existing inefficiencies of FD under perfect commitment. The key effect is that
inefficiencies due to distortionary refinancing under FD are reduced: when η is slightly
below one, there is a small probability that refinancing is handled by the center in a fully
efficient way.
Large Deviations from Perfect Commitment. As η decreases significantly below one,
the reduction in FD distortions described previously can be potentially offset by overin-
vestment inefficiencies (as η converges to zero the FD regime converges towards PD, in
which too many projects are initiated). Unfortunately, it is not possible to show analyti-
cally how the threshold π̂(θ, η) is affected by a large decrease in η with respect to η = 1.27
So to gain some insight into this case, we appeal to numerical simulations.
In Figure 9, we show the frontier π̂(θ, η) within a particular parameterization. We
normalize κ to 1, set c0 = 0.04, b = 0.1, L = 3, and assume that the cost c is distributed
27The main complication is that, in general, the sign of
∂EŴFD(π,θ,η)
∂η depends on the values of (π, θ, η).
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Figure 9: Numerical simulation of the frontier π̂(θ, η). κ is normalized to 1, c0 = 0.04, b =
0.1, L = 3, and c is distributed according to a Beta(2, 2). Full decentralization dominates
to the southwest of the frontier π̂(θ, η).
according to the symmetric distribution Beta(2, 2). We use η = {1, 0.9, 0.6}. This parame-
terization is chosen to illustrate our main points in a clear way, but such conclusions have
been confirmed for other parameter values. Figure 9 illustrates two main facts. First, even
for values of η significantly below one, the areas of FD and PD dominance are analogous
to those in the baseline model. Second, changing η has an ambiguous effect on π̂(θ, η),
depending on the configuration of (θ, η). In particular, when η decreases from 1 to 0.9, the
frontier π̂(θ, η) shifts up, which is consistent with our analysis in the previous section. As
η decreases further to 0.6, π̂(θ, η) rotates clockwise. As η converges to zero (not shown),
FD nests the PD regime, so that π̂(θ, η) collapses to zero.
7.2.4 Tax Decentralization vs. “No Bailout” Clauses
In this section, we generalize the previous analysis by allowing the Congress to choose
over tax decentralization (PD or FD) and over incorporating or not a “no bailout” clause
(henceforth NBC) in the Constitution. This allows us to isolate the effects of reassigning
tax instruments from the effects of banning bailouts in an environment of imperfect com-
mitment. We show that our previous results regarding the optimal regime are robust to
this extension.
As before, the central government moves after the regions at the refinancing stage,
unless there is a NBC and the center abides by it (the latter occurring with probability
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η). Notably, once the inclusion of a NBC becomes a choice variable to the Congress, four
possible combinations of decentralization and existence of NBCs arise. We’ve already
discussed two of those configurations in the previous analysis, namely, FD with a NBC
and PD without a NBC. In what follows, we examine the two remaining systems and
show how they affect the regime comparison.
First, consider a FD regime without a NBC. This system is identical to a FD regime
which does incorporate the NBC, but that has a center with no commitment capacity, or
η = 0. As discussed previously, the outcomes of such an institutional arrangement boil
down to PD without a NBC (i.e., all projects are initiated and refinanced if incomplete).
We thus refer to the resulting system in the absence of a clause banning bailouts as a “de
facto” PD regime.
Now we look at the outcomes of PD with a NBC. It is easy to see that if there is a con-
stitutional ban on bailouts, PD is equivalent to a FD regime in which regions entirely lack
fiscal capacity, i.e., with θ = 0. The logic is simple. Suppose that the Congress incorpo-
rates a NBC. When θ = 0, refinancing under FD is too costly for the regions. Thus, incom-
plete projects are only refinanced by the central government with probability (1− η). But,
by construction, this is the same refinancing equilibrium as under PD. In turn, regions
make the same investment decisions under either tax decentralization scheme (more pre-
cisely, given (π, η), local governments initiate projects if and only if c ≤ cFD(π, 0, η)). The
key implication from this result is that PD will always be dominated by FD in the presence
of a NBC (since welfare under FD increases with θ).
We conclude by analyzing the choice of the optimal regime when the Congress can
choose whether or not to constitutionally ban bailouts. As per the above arguments, find-
ing the optimal regime in this richer environment reduces to comparing the performances
of only two institutional schemes: “de facto” PD (if bailouts are not banned) vs. FD with
a NBC. Actually, these are the same regimes that we contrasted in Section 7.2.3. Hence,
our previous results go through.
8 Conclusion
This paper presents a model featuring a central government and regional authorities.
The latter are characterized by their levels of administrative and fiscal capacities. We an-
alyze two fiscal regimes. Under partial decentralization, regional governments rely on
central bailouts to refinance previously started projects. Hence, regions face soft budget
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constraints and can overinvest in local public projects. Under full decentralization, re-
gional governments cannot rely on central bailouts, capital tax competition increases the
marginal cost of public funds, and regional governments may underinvest.
The main goal of the paper is to conduct a normative comparison between these
regimes and determine how different levels of regional state capacity affect this com-
parison. Contrary to what an aprioristic view could indicate, we show that the presence
of sufficiently low levels of administrative capacity is a necessary condition for full de-
centralization dominance. Moreover, this condition may also be sufficient depending on
the projects’ characteristics.
We abstract from a number of realistic features to focus on a particular trade-off. Three
assumptions in these regards are worth mentioning here: capital being the only input
in production, the immobility of residents across regions, and the ex ante symmetry of
regions. First, the presence of tax competition distortions under full decentralization re-
quires that at least one taxable factor be mobile across regions. In the paper, capital plays
the role of such mobile factor, but our results would still hold if we replaced capital by a
different input (such as labor) which could move across regions and be taxed. Incorporat-
ing additional productive factors, mobile or immobile, could give rise to more complex
forms of tax competition. In principle, that might either hinder or favor full vis-a`-vis
partial decentralization optimality.28
Second, the possibility of regional migration could increase the level of expected wel-
fare under full decentralization, all else equal. The reason is that, unlike under the partial
decentralization regime, this system can generate regional differences in the provision of
public goods (as projects are not always refinanced). Allowing individuals to exploit such
differentials could increase expected welfare from a utilitarian perspective.
Finally, an interesting route for further research is to incorporate ex ante asymme-
tries between regions (either in capital endowments or in state capacities), and analyze
whether regional asymmetry is more or less conducive to decentralization dominance.
This would also yield a more suitable framework to deliver quantitative assessments.
28We also abstract from local commodity taxation. This would lead to a number of issues on cross-border
shopping, and destination vs. origin principles, which are outside of the scope of the paper. See Wilson
(1999) for a review on this matter.
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Appendix
A Administrative vs. Fiscal Capacity Across U.S. States
This section presents an illustrative example where the correlation between regional administra-
tive and fiscal capacities is weak. We use data on the U.S. States for 2002-2003. Data on fiscal
capacity is taken from Yilmaz et al. (2006), who measure fiscal disparities across the U.S. States
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for fiscal year 2002. We use two variables which roughly map to the index of fiscal capacity θ in
this paper. The first variable is tax effort, which is the ratio of actual tax collections to potential tax
revenues. The second variable, revenue effort, is the ratio of actual revenues to potential revenues.
The difference between these measures is that “revenue” in the latter include actual tax collections
plus other revenue from nontax sources, such as user charges or lotteries (see Yilmaz et al. (2006)
for details). To approximate administrative capacity we follow La Porta et al. (1999) who proxy the
quality of public good provision through output measures of essential public goods, such as infant
mortality, literacy, or infrastructure quality. We focus on infant mortality and illiteracy, given that
these series are widely available at the regional level for the U.S..29
Figure A.1 shows the scatter plots involving the four variables described previously (two prox-
ies for fiscal capacity and two proxies for administrative capacity).30 Clearly, the correlation be-
tween the measures of fiscal and administrative capacity is extremely low. In fact, in all cases
one cannot reject the absence of correlation at reasonable levels of significance. For example, the
Spearman correlation coefficient between infant mortality and tax effort is 0.025, with a p-value of
0.86.
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider an arbitrary region ℓ. By (3), initiating the project is a dominant strategy if c ≤ L b−c01−π ≡
cPD(π). As b ≥ 2c0 (by Assumption 1) and L ≥ 2, it follows that cPD(π) ≥ b, so that all projects
are initiated.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Given a profile of tax rates τ = {τ1, ..., τL}, a resident of region ℓ decides where to invest its capital
endowment by solving the following problem:
max
hℓ,{ fℓm}m 6=ℓ
hℓ (1− τℓ) + ∑
m 6=ℓ
fℓm (1− τm)−
1
2
( ∑
m 6=ℓ
fℓm)
2
29Infant mortality for 2002 is taken from the National Vital Statistics Reports elaborated by the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention. Illiteracy is measured by the percent of individuals over 16 years old
lacking basic prose literacy skills for 2003, as estimated by the National Center for Education Statistics.
30We exclude New York (Alaska) from the first (second) column for being an outlier in tax effort (revenue
effort).
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Figure A.1: Fiscal vs. administrative capacities across U.S. states for 2002-2003. Fiscal
capacity is proxied via tax effort and revenue effort. Administrative capacity is proxied
via infant mortality and illiteracy.
subject to
hℓ + ∑
m 6=ℓ
fℓm = κ, and fℓm ≥ 0 ∀m 6= ℓ,
where hℓ is the level of capital invested in region ℓ. Letting λℓn be the multipliers associated with
the non-negativity constraints, first-order conditions ∀n 6= ℓ yield
τℓ − τn + λℓn = ∑
m 6=ℓ
fℓm, (B.1)
along with the complementary slackness condition: λℓn fℓn = 0, λℓn ≥ 0. We prove the lemma by
means of two claims.
Claim 1. Assume there exist two regions m, n 6= ℓ, with τm > τn. Then fℓm = 0.
Proof. Subtracting m’s first-order condition from n’s first-order condition, we obtain τm − τn +
λℓn = λℓm. As τm > τn and λℓn ≥ 0, we get λℓm > 0. Hence, complementary slackness yields
fℓm = 0.
Let M˜ be the set of regions m˜ 6= ℓ that have chosen the minimum tax rate τ˜ℓ = min{τm}m 6=ℓ.
An immediate consequence of the previous claim is that fℓm = 0 for all regions m 6= ℓ, m˜. Next we
characterize capital flows to the set M˜.
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Claim 2. Assume that τℓ ≥ τ˜ℓ. Then ∑m˜∈M˜ fℓm˜ = τℓ − τ˜ℓ.
Proof. For all ℓ, first-order conditions that characterize flows fℓm˜ are: τℓ − τ˜ℓ + λℓm˜ = ∑m˜∈M˜ fℓm˜.
To satisfy these conditions, all multipliers λℓm˜ should be equal across m˜. If they were all strictly
positive, then all outflows fℓm˜ should be equal to 0, implying that ∑m˜∈M˜ fℓm˜ = 0. But as τℓ ≥ τ˜ℓ,
this would yield a contradiction, so all multipliers should be zero. Using λℓm˜ = 0 for all m˜ into
(B.1) yields ∑m˜∈M˜ fℓm˜ = τℓ − τ˜ℓ, as was to be shown.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Let τm be the profile of tax rates chosen by regions m 6= ℓ. Given τm, the regional government of ℓ
can follow three types of strategies: set τℓ above, below, or equal to τ˜ℓ ≡ min{τm}m 6=ℓ. Let τℓ(τm)
and τℓ(τm) be the optimal tax rates conditional on setting τℓ above or below τ˜ℓ, respectively. We
start by characterizing those tax rates:31
1. If the regional government of ℓ set its tax rate strictly above τ˜ℓ, there would be capital out-
flows to regions m˜ ∈ M˜. Hence, regional welfare would be
WFDℓ = (κ − ∑
m˜∈M˜
fℓm˜) (1− τℓ) + ∑
m˜∈M˜
fℓm˜ (1− τ˜ℓ)−
1
2
( ∑
m˜∈M˜
fℓm˜)
2 + b.
By the Envelope Theorem, ∂WFD
ℓ
/∂τℓ = −(κ−∑m˜∈M˜ fℓm˜) < 0. So the regional government
of ℓ should set the lowest tax rate that satisfies its budget constraint
θτℓ(κ − ∑
m˜∈M˜
fℓm˜) = c. (B.2)
Using Lemma 1, the smallest root of (B.2) is given by
τℓ(τm) ≡
1
2
[
κ + τ˜ℓ −
√
(κ + τ˜ℓ)
2 −
4c
θ
]
. (B.3)
Throughout the paper we assume that κ is large enough so that the square root on the right
hand side exists.32
2. If the regional government of ℓ set its tax rate strictly below τ˜ℓ, region ℓ would experience
no capital outflows, but positive capital inflows (which do not affect regional welfare). The
31Due to specific features of this model, we cannot apply the methodology in Wildasin (1988) to derive
the equilibrium tax rates.
32Specifically, it is assumed that κ > max{
√
4b(L− 1)/θ, b/θ}. This not only ensures the existence of
τℓ, but also of τℓ defined in (B.6). Additionally, the condition guarantees that equilibrium tax rates satisfy
τ
sym
ℓ
< 1 for all ℓ.
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regional government of ℓ would then choose the lowest tax rate that satisfies its budget
constraint
θτℓ(κ + ∑
m 6=ℓ
fmℓ) = c, (B.4)
where
∑
m 6=ℓ
fmℓ = ∑
m 6=ℓ
τm − (L− 1)τℓ (B.5)
are the total capital inflows to region ℓ. Using (B.5), the smallest root of (B.4) is
τℓ(τm) ≡
1
2
 1L− 1
(
κ + ∑
m 6=ℓ
τm
)
−
√√√√√κ + ∑m 6=ℓ τm
L− 1
2 − 4c
θ(L− 1)
 . (B.6)
By definition, τℓ is only consistent with τ˜ℓ > 0.
Next we characterize the equilibria of the tax competition game, depending on whether all regions
refinance their incomplete projects, or at least one region does not refinance. It is worth noting that
τℓ and τℓ are decreasing functions of the taxes set by all other regions. This implies that tax rates
are strategic substitutes.
Scenario 1: All regions decided to refinance their incomplete projects
We focus on symmetric Nash equilibria in pure strategies where τℓ = τm for all ℓ, m. We begin by
establishing that τℓ = c/(θκ) ≡ τ
sym
ℓ
for all ℓ, is a Nash equilibrium. In fact, suppose that τm =
c/(θκ) for m 6= ℓ, and denote this profile using the shorthand notation τm = c/(θκ). Plugging
into (B.3) and (B.6) gives:
τℓ(c/(θκ)) = c/(θκ) = τℓ(c/(θκ)).
This contradicts the definitions of τℓ and τℓ, and implies that the best response of ℓ is τℓ = c/(θκ).
Now we show that when all regions decided to refinance, the equilibrium with τℓ = τ
sym
ℓ
for
all ℓ is actually the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium. First, suppose τm = c/(θκ) + ǫ for all
m 6= ℓ, with ǫ > 0. Using this profile into (B.3) and (B.6) we obtain
τℓ(c/(θκ) + ǫ) < c/(θκ) + ǫ, and τℓ(c/(θκ) + ǫ) < c/(θκ) + ǫ, (B.7)
which implies that only downward deviations from c/(θκ) + ǫ are feasible (as the first expression
contradicts the definition of τℓ). Regional welfare from downward deviating is
WFDℓ
(
τℓ(c/(θκ) + ǫ)
)
= κ
(
1− τℓ(c/(θκ) + ǫ)
)
+ b,
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while welfare from replicating c/(θκ) + ǫ is
WFDℓ
(
c/(θκ) + ǫ
)
= κ
(
1− (c/(θκ) + ǫ)
)
+ b.
It follows from (B.7) that WFD
ℓ
(
τℓ(c/(θκ) + ǫ)
)
> WFD
ℓ
(
c/(θκ) + ǫ
)
, so that downward deviating
is profitable. Hence, we rule out symmetric equilibria with τℓ = c/(θκ) + ǫ for all ℓ.
Finally, assume by contradiction that τℓ = c/(θκ) − ǫ for all ℓ is a symmetric equilibrium,
with ǫ > 0. In this case, tax revenues for each region ℓ are given by θκ
(
c/(θκ)− ǫ
)
< c, so that
projects cannot be refinanced. We conclude that c/(θκ)− ǫ cannot be a symmetric equilibrium of
the subgame emerging when all regions refinance.
Scenario 2: At least one region has decided not to refinance
Under this scenario, τ˜ℓ = 0. Plugging into (B.3) gives τ
asym
ℓ
.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 3
First we prove existence of c1(θ) and c2(θ). When there is at least one region that does not refi-
nance, the total cost from completing a project in any region T(c, θ) is a strictly increasing and
convex function of c with limc→0 T(c, θ) = 0 and limc→b T(c, θ) > b. Hence, Bolzano’s Theorem
implies that there exists a threshold c1(θ) ∈ (0, b) such that, when c ≤ c1(θ), b− T(c, θ) ≥ 0. Also,
as c/θ ∈ [c, T(c, θ)], there exists another threshold c2(θ) > c1(θ) such that c2(θ)/θ = b.
Suppose c < c1(θ). In this case, refinancing is a dominant strategy. This is because the
marginal payoffs from refinancing are positive, regardless of what other regions do, i.e., b− c/θ >
b − T(c, θ) > 0. On the other hand, if c > c2(θ), not refinancing is a dominant strategy as
b − T(c, θ) < b − c/θ < 0. Now assume c ∈ [c1(θ), c2(θ)]. If at least one region does not refi-
nance, not refinancing is the best response because b − T(c, θ) < 0. However, if all regions face
incomplete projects we have:
WFDℓ (R, R) ≡ κ − c0 + b− c/θ ≥ κ − c0 ≡ W
FD
ℓ (NR, R), (B.8)
and
WFDℓ (R, NR) ≡ κ − c0 + b− T(c, θ) ≤ κ − c0 ≡ W
FD
ℓ (NR, NR), (B.9)
where WFD
ℓ
(rℓ, rm) is the payoff of region ℓ in the refinancing game, rℓ ∈ {R, NR} is the refinanc-
ing strategy for region ℓ, R (NR) denotes “refinancing” (“not refinancing”), rm is the profile of
refinancing decisions in regions m 6= ℓ, and R and NR denote the profiles where all m 6= ℓ regions
play R and NR, respectively.
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The payoffs in (B.8)-(B.9) give rise to a coordination game between regions, with two Nash
equilibria: either all regions refinance in equilibrium, or no region does. We choose the first equi-
librium because it is the only one which is strong (Aumann (1959)), i.e., taking as given the strate-
gies of the others, no coalition of players can jointly deviate and thus increase the payoffs of each
of its members. More specifically, by definition of Nash equilibria, no region can do better by uni-
laterally changing its equilibrium strategy. Coalitions of L−regions, with 1 < L < L, can do no
better by deviating either: if the other regions refinance (not refinance), the L regions do not want
to deviate because b− c/θ ≥ 0 (b− T(c, θ) ≤ 0). Finally, take the L-regions coalition. If all regions
refinance, they do not want to deviate since b− c/θ ≥ 0. But, when no region refinances, they all
wish to deviate because the refinancing equilibrium is Pareto optimal.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Henceforth, iℓ ∈ {I, NI} denotes the investment strategy for region ℓ, with I (NI) being “invest-
ment” (”no investment”). Similarly, let im ≡ {im}m 6=ℓ, and define EW
FD
ℓ
(iℓ, im) as the expected
welfare of the project initiation game for region ℓ. We also use im = I (im = N I) to denote the
profile under which all regions m 6= ℓ initiate (do not initiate) the project, and im = Ic to represent
the complement of I. We first characterize the project initiation equilibria as a function of the re-
alization of c. As per Proposition 3, we consider three cases depending on the type of equilibrium
in the refinancing subgame. (We assume throughout that sufficient conditions for the existence
of the thresholds defined below hold; this only allows us to consider the most general case to
characterize equilibria.)
Case 1: c < c1(θ). Refinancing is a dominant strategy in this scenario. Hence, welfare of region
ℓ from initiating a project can either be given by
EWFDℓ (I, I) = κ − c0 + b− (1− π)
L c
θ
− (1− π)(1− (1− π)L−1)T(c, θ), (B.10)
when all other regions initiate, or by
EWFDℓ (I, I
c) = κ − c0 + b− (1− π)T(c, θ), (B.11)
if some region does not invest. As we focus on symmetric Nash equilibria in pure strategies, we
need to consider two possible equilibria: all regions initiate projects, or no region does. The first
equilibrium occurs if and only if EWFD
ℓ
(I, I) ≥ EWFD
ℓ
(NI, I) = κ. Using (B.10), this condition
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boils down to c ≤ cR1(π, θ), where cR1(π, θ) is implicitly defined by
(1− π)
[
(1− π)L−1
cR1(π, θ)
θ
+ (1− (1− π)L−1)T(cR1(π, θ), θ)
]
= b− c0. (B.12)
Analogously, a symmetric equilibrium with no region initiating projects emerges if and only if κ ≥
EWFD
ℓ
(I, N I). This is equivalent to c ≥ cR2(π, θ), with cR2(π, θ) satisfying (1−π)T(cR2(π, θ), θ) =
b − c0, which follows from (B.11). Since T(c, θ) > c/θ and T(c, θ) is increasing in c, we have that
cR1(π, θ) ≥ cR2(π, θ) for all (π, θ). Therefore, both (I, I) and (NI, N I) are Nash equilibria when
c ∈ [cR2(π, θ), cR1(π, θ)]. We select the former equilibrium as this is the only one which is strong.
From now on, we denote the relevant frontier by cR(π, θ) ≡ cR1(π, θ).
Case 2: c ∈ [c1(θ), c2(θ)]. In this case, all regions refinance if and only if all regions face
incomplete projects. Welfare functions then satisfy:
EWFDℓ (I, I) = κ − c0 + πb + (1− π)
L
(
b−
c
θ
)
, and EWFDℓ (I, I
c) = κ − c0 + πb.
These expressions imply that: (i) there is a threshold cNAR(π, θ) defined by
(1− π)
[
(1− π)L−1
cNAR(π, θ)
θ
+ (1− (1− π)L−1)b
]
= b− c0, (B.13)
such that (I, I) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium whenever c ≤ cNAR(π, θ), and (ii) the condition
for (NI, N I) to be a symmetric equilibrium reduces to π ≤ c0/b. Consequently, when (c,π, θ) is
such that c ≤ cNAR(π, θ) and π ≤ c0/b, multiple symmetric equilibria emerge. But, as in Case 1,
only the equilibrium with investment is strong, so we keep that outcome when multiple equilibria
occurs.
Case 3: c > c2(θ). Here regions do not refinance incomplete projects. It is then straightforward
to show that investing is a dominant strategy if and only if π > c0/b. Otherwise, no region invests
in equilibrium.
We conclude by constructing the frontier separating investment from no investment outcomes for
any (c,π, θ). Take any θ and let π1(θ) be implicitly defined by cR(π1(θ), θ) = c1(θ). One can easily
verify that
cR(π1(θ), θ) = cNAR(π1(θ), θ) and cNAR(c0/b, θ) = c2(θ).
We assume that sufficient conditions for cR(π, θ) and cNAR(π, θ) to be increasing in π hold,
and that cR(0, θ) < c1(θ).
33 This ensures that cR(π, θ) and cNAR(π, θ) cross c1(θ) and c2(θ), respec-
33A sufficient condition for cR(π, θ) and cNAR(π, θ) to be increasing in π is that L ≤ L̂ ≡ b(b− c1(1))
−1.
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tively, at most once, and that π1(θ) < c0/b. Other configurations can be accommodated as special
cases. We can then define a frontier cFD(π, θ) as
cFD(π, θ) =

cR(π, θ) if π ∈ [0,π1(θ)],
cNAR(π, θ) if π ∈ (π1(θ), c0/b],
b if π ∈ (c0/b, 1].
Using the previous results, it follows that given (π, θ), all regions invest when c ≤ cFD(π, θ).
Otherwise, no region invests in equilibrium. The threshold cFD(π, θ) is illustrated in Figure 2.
B.6 Proof of Corollary 2
We only need to show that cR(π, θ) and cNAR(π, θ) are below c
∗(π) for all (π, θ). This simply
follows from the definition of c∗(π), and by inspecting (B.12) and (B.13).
B.7 Proof of Proposition 5
Under partial decentralization, any project is initiated and refinanced if needed. Hence, equilib-
rium expected welfare under this regime is given by
EŴPD(π) = κ + b− c0 − (1− π)c. (B.14)
Using the thresholds defined in the proof of Proposition 4, we can write equilibrium expected
welfare under full decentralization as
EŴFD(π, θ) =

κ +
´ cR(π,θ)
0
[
b− c0 − (1− π)Lc/θ
−(1− π)
(
1− (1− π)L−1
)
T(c, θ)
]
h(c)dc if π ∈ [0,π1(θ)],
κ +
´ cNAR(π,θ)
0
[
πb− c0 + (1− π)L (b− c/θ)
]
h(c)dc
+(1− π)
(
1− (1− π)L−1
) ´ c1(θ)
0
[
b− T(c, θ)
]
h(c)dc if π ∈ (π1(θ), c0/b],
κ + (1− π)
(
1− (1− π)L−1
) ´ c1(θ)
0 [b− T(c, θ)] h(c)dc
+(1− π)L
´ c2(θ)
0 [b− c/θ] h(c)dc + πb− c0 if π ∈ (c0/b, 1].
(B.15)
The intercept of cR(0, θ) is guaranteed to be below c1(θ) as long as b− c0 < c1(1).
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By (B.14), expected welfare under partial decentralization is a continuous, increasing and linear
function of π. On the other hand, the expected welfare function under full decentralization in
(B.15) is continuous and convex in π, and continuous and increasing in θ (see Online Appendix
for details).
To characterize the optimal regime across (π, θ), we proceed in four steps. First, suppose
π ∈ [c0/b, 1). Here we can show that EŴFD(π, θ) < EŴPD(π) = EŴ∗(π), where EŴ∗(π) is the
equilibrium expected welfare at the first best. Hence, in this case partial decentralization always
dominates. Second, suppose π = 1. We can prove that EŴFD(π, θ) converges from below to
EŴ∗(π) as π → 1. And since EŴPD(1) = EŴ∗(1), it follows that partial and full decentralization
are equivalent when π = 1. Third, assume that π = 0. The next lemma characterizes the regime
comparison for this case.
Lemma 3. Assume that π = 0. Two scenarios can emerge:
1. Suppose c < b − c0, then there exists a threshold θ0 such that: EŴFD(0, θ0) = EŴPD(0),
EŴFD(0, θ) ≥ EŴPD(0) if θ ≥ θ0, and EŴFD(0, θ) < EŴPD(0) otherwise.
2. Suppose c ≥ b− c0, then EŴFD(0, θ) ≥ EŴPD(0) for all θ.
Proof. By (B.14) and (B.15),
EŴPD(0) = κ + b− c0 − c, and EŴ
FD(0, θ) = κ +
θ(b−c0)ˆ
0
[
b− c0 −
c
θ
]
h(c)dc. (B.16)
The last expression implies that
EŴFD(0, 0) = κ, and EŴFD(0, 1) = κ + b− c0 − c−
bˆ
b−c0
[b− c0 − c] h(c)dc. (B.17)
Suppose c < b− c0. Then (B.16) and (B.17) imply that EŴFD(0, 0) < EŴPD(0) and EŴFD(0, 1) >
EŴPD(0). Since EŴFD(0, θ) monotonically increases with θ, it follows that there exists a unique
θ0 such that EŴ
FD(0, θ) ≥ EŴPD(0) for θ ≥ θ0, and EŴFD(0, θ) ≤ EŴPD(0) for θ ≤ θ0. Now
suppose c ≥ b− c0. Then EŴFD(0, 0) ≥ EŴPD(0), so that EŴFD(0, θ) ≥ EŴPD(0) for all θ.
Fourth, suppose π ∈ (0, c0/b). In the lines of Lemma 3, we consider two cases:
1. If c < b− c0, limπ→0[EŴFD(π, θ)−EŴPD(π)] ≥ 0 provided θ ≥ θ0. Hence, as EŴFD(π, θ)
converges to EŴPD(π) from below when π → 1, EŴFD(π, θ) crosses EŴPD(π) from above
on the interval (0, c0/b). Denote the value of π where such intersection occurs by π̂(θ).
Similar arguments yield that EŴFD(π, θ) < EŴPD(π) if θ < θ0.
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2. If c ≥ b − c0, limπ→0[EŴFD(π, θ) − EŴPD(π)] ≥ 0 for all θ. We can then show that, as
π increases, there exists a threshold π̂(θ) such that full decentralization dominates when
π ≤ π̂(θ). The logic is analogous to the one applied for case 1.
Using a geometric argument, it follows that π̂(θ) identified in cases 1 and 2 above is unique. If
there was another intersection, then EŴFD(π, θ) would cross EŴPD(π) from below. But that
would be inconsistent with the facts that EŴFD(π, θ) is convex, EŴPD(π) is linear, and that the
former converges to the latter from below as π → 1. To show that π̂(θ) is increasing in θ, we apply
the Implicit Function Theorem to the expression defining π̂(θ). This yields
∂π̂(θ)
∂θ
= −
∂EŴFD(π̂(θ), θ)/∂θ
∂EŴFD(π̂(θ), θ)/∂π − ∂EŴPD(π̂(θ))/∂π
> 0,
which follows from the fact that EŴFD(π, θ) crosses EŴPD(π) from above at π̂(θ).
B.8 Proof of Proposition 6
By inspection of Figure 6a (see Online Appendix for a derivation), equilibrium expected welfare
when national fiscal capacity is indexed by θ̂ is given by
EŴPD(π, θ̂) =

κ +
´ θ̂b
0
[
b− c0 − (1− π)
c
θ̂
]
h(c)dc if π ≤ c0/b,
κ + πb− c0 + (1− π)
´ θ̂b
0
[
b− c
θ̂
]
h(c)dc otherwise.
To assess the impact of a decrease in θ̂ on the expected regional welfare, we compute
∂EŴPD(π, θ̂)
∂θ̂
=

´ θ̂b
0
(1−π)c
θ̂2
h(c)dc + (πb− c0)h(θ̂b)b if π ≤ c0/b,
´ θ̂b
0
(1−π)c
θ̂2
h(c)dc otherwise.
Note that limθ̂→1
∂EŴPD(π,θ̂)
∂θ̂
∣∣∣
π=0
= c − c0h(b)b. This expression can be positive or negative. The
last case can occur if, among other things, the density h(c) concentrates sufficient mass on the
highest value of its domain, i.e., on b.
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B.9 Proofs of Section 7.2
B.9.1 Project Initiation under FD
First we provide a sketch of the proof of the existence of cFD(π, θ, η) (further details are contained
in the Online Appendix). The argument goes along the lines of the proof of Proposition 4, and
we apply a similar notation here. Suppose that c < c1(θ). Then all regions initiate projects in
equilibrium if and only if c ≤ cRI (π, θ, η), where cRI (π, θ, η) is the cost that equalizes EW
FD
ℓ
(I, I)
and EWFD
ℓ
(NI, I), or
η(1− π)
[
(1− π)L−1
cRI
θ
+ (1− (1− π)L−1)T(cRI , θ)
]
+ (1− η)(1− π)
cRI
L
= b− c0.
Similarly, no region initiates if and only if c ≥ cRNI (π, θ, η), where the latter equalizes EW
FD
ℓ
(NI, N I)
and EWFD
ℓ
(I, N I), so that
η(1− π)T(cRNI , θ) + (1− η)(1− π)
cRNI
L
= b− c0.
It is straightforward to prove that cRI ≥ cRNI , which implies that there is multiple equilibria for
c ∈ [cRNI , cRI ]. As before, we apply a refinement requiring that the equilibrium be strong. It can
be shown that all regions investing is the unique strong equilibrium if and only if c ≤ cRL(π, θ, η),
with cRL(π, θ, η) satisfying
η(1− π)
[
(1− π)L−1
cRL
θ
+ (1− (1− π)L−1)T(cRL , θ)
]
+ (1− η)(1− π)cRL = b− c0.
Otherwise, no region investing is the unique strong equilibrium. Given this result, we define the
threshold cR(π, θ, η) ≡ max{cRL(π, θ, η), cRNI (π, θ, η)}, such that all regions invest if and only if
c ≤ cR(π, θ, η).
Now assume that c ∈ [c1(θ), c2(θ)]. This case is analogous to the previous scenario. In partic-
ular, we can define a threshold cNAR(π, θ, η) ≡ max{cNARL(π, θ, η), cNARNI (π, θ, η)}, such that all
regions invest if and only if c ≤ cNAR(π, θ, η), where cNARL(π, θ, η) and cNARNI (π, θ, η) are defined
by
η(1− π)
[
(1− π)L−1
cNARL
θ
+ (1− (1− π)L−1)b
]
+ (1− η)(1− π)cNARL = b− c0,
and
η(1− π)b + (1− η)(1− π)
cNARNI
L
= b− c0,
respectively. This construction ensures that the initiation equilibrium is strong.
Finally, suppose that c > c2(θ). We can show that in this case all regions initiate projects if and
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only if
c < cNR(π, η) ≡
L
(1− η)(1− π)
[ηπb + (1− η)b− c0] .
To construct the frontier cFD(π, θ, η), we define the π-cutoffs π1(θ, η), π2(θ, η) and π3(θ, η) as
cR(π1(θ, η), θ, η) = c1(θ), cNAR(π2(θ, η), θ, η) = c2(θ), and cNR(π3(θ, η), θ, η) = b.
Using that cNAR(π1(θ, η), θ, η) = c1(θ), cNR(π2(θ, η), θ, η) = c2(θ), and assuming that cR and cNAR
are increasing in π (other configurations can be contemplated) we can define cFD(π, θ, η) as
cFD(π, θ, η) =

cR(π, θ, η) if π ∈ [0,π1(θ, η)],
cNAR(π, θ, η) if π ∈ (π1(θ, η),π2(θ, η)],
cNR(π, θ, η) if π ∈ (π2(θ, η),π3(θ, η)],
b if π ∈ (π3(θ, η), 1].
To conclude, based on the expressions defining cR, cNAR and cNR above, it is simple to verify that
∂ci(π,θ,η)
∂η ≤ 0 for i = {R, NAR, NR}. This proves that c
FD(π, θ, η) decreases with η.
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B.9.2 Proposition 7
Part 1. Using the π-cutoffs defined previously, equilibrium expected welfare under FD is:
EŴFD(π, θ, η) =

κ +
´ cR(π,θ,η)
0
{
b− c0 − η(1− π)
[
(1− π)L−1 cθ
+(1− (1− π)L−1)T(c, θ)
]
− (1− η)(1− π)c
}
h(c)dc if π ∈ [0,π1(θ, η)],
κ +
´ cNAR(π,θ,η)
0
{
− c0 + η
[
πb + (1− π)L
(
b− cθ
) ]
+(1− η)(b− (1− π)c)
}
h(c)dc
+η(1− π)(1− (1− π)L−1)
´ c1(θ)
0 [b− T(c, θ)]h(c)dc if π ∈ (π1(θ, η),π2(θ, η)],
κ +
´ cNR(π,θ,η)
0
{
− c0 + ηπb + (1− η)(b− (1− π)c)
}
h(c)dc
+η(1− π)L
´ c2(θ)
0
[
b− cθ
]
h(c)dc
+η(1− π)(1− (1− π)L−1)
´ c1(θ)
0 [b− T(c, θ)]h(c)dc if π ∈ (π2(θ, η),π3(θ, η)],
κ − c0 + ηπb + (1− η)b− (1− η)(1− π)c¯
+η(1− π)L
´ c2(θ)
0
[
b− cθ
]
h(c)dc
+η(1− π)(1− (1− π)L−1)
´ c1(θ)
0 [b− T(c, θ)]h(c)dc if π ∈ (π3(θ, η), 1].
(B.18)
This function is continuous and, in a neighborhood of η = 1, it is also convex in π and increasing
in θ. Since EŴPD(π) is linear and increasing, and EŴFD(1, θ, η) = κ − c0 + b = EŴPD(1), it
follows that for η close to one, EŴFD(π, θ, η) and EŴPD(π) cross at most once at π ∈ [0, 1). This
crossing defines the frontier π̂(θ, η), whose properties can be derived using the arguments in the
proof of Proposition 5.
Part 2. Since EŴPD(π) is independent of η, we only need to show that for all (π, θ):
lim
η→1
∂EŴFD(π, θ, η)
∂η
≤ 0. (B.19)
Using that cR → cRL and cNAR → cNARL as η → 1, it can be shown that (B.19) holds for the
first two segments in (B.18) (see Online Appendix). The third segment vanishes as η → 1,
since we can prove that π2(θ, η) = 1 −
b−c0
ηb+(1−η)
c2(θ)
L
, and π3(θ, η) = 1 −
b−c0
ηb+(1−η) bL
, so that
(π2(θ, η),π3(θ, η)) → (c0/b, c0/b). In the fourth segment of (B.18), ∂EŴFD(π, θ, η)/∂η ≤ 0 for all
(π, θ, η).
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Highlights
• We study the optimal degree of tax decentralization under imperfect state capacity
• Local administrative (fiscal) ability affects public good delivery (tax collection)
• Full tax decentralization is optimal only if administrative capacity is low enough
• Such a condition can be sufficient, depending on local projects’ characteristics
• Some extensions are presented
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